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Abstract
Background: Prior infection with one strain TB has been linked with diminished likelihood of re-infection by a new strain.
This paper attempts to determine the role of declining prevalence of drug-susceptible TB in enabling future epidemics of
MDR-TB.
Methods: A computer simulation of MDR-TB epidemics was developed using an agent-based model platform programmed
in NetLogo (See http://mdr.tbtools.org/). Eighty-one scenarios were created, varying levels of treatment quality, diagnostic
accuracy, microbial fitness cost, and the degree of immunogenicity elicited by drug-susceptible TB. Outcome measures
were the number of independent MDR-TB cases per trial and the proportion of trials resulting in MDR-TB epidemics for a
500 year period after drug therapy for TB is introduced.
Results: MDR-TB epidemics propagated more extensively after TB prevalence had fallen. At a case detection rate of 75%,
improving therapeutic compliance from 50% to 75% can reduce the probability of an epidemic from 45% to 15%.
Paradoxically, improving the case-detection rate from 50% to 75% when compliance with DOT is constant at 75% increases
the probability of MDR-TB epidemics from 3% to 45%.
Conclusions: The ability of MDR-TB to spread depends on the prevalence of drug-susceptible TB. Immunologic protection
conferred by exposure to drug-susceptible TB can be a crucial factor that prevents MDR-TB epidemics when TB treatment is
poor. Any single population that successfully reduces its burden of drug-susceptible TB will have reduced herd immunity to
externally or internally introduced strains of MDR-TB and can experience heightened vulnerability to an epidemic. Since
countries with good TB control may be more vulnerable, their self interest dictates greater promotion of case detection and
DOTS implementation in countries with poor control to control their risk of MDR-TB.
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Introduction
Multidrug resistant (MDR) tuberculosis affects between 0.5 to 2
million annually [1,2]. Yet there were only 111 MDR-TB cases
reported in the U.S. in 2006 [1] with 82% of U.S. cases foreign
born. Both MDR and overall TB caseloads in the U.S. have
declined since the 1990s [3,4]. Although the current low burden of
MDR-TB in the US may fuel complacency from speculation that
drug resistant mycobacteria lack sufficient virulence to sustain
large epidemics, growing caseloads in central Asia suggest
otherwise. Ten of the regions with the highest and most rapidly
growing prevalence of MDR-TB are all in the former Soviet
Union [1]. It is significant that current MDR-TB epidemics in
central Asia followed on the heels of modest success in the control
of TB in the Soviet Union [5,6].
Because primary infection with drug susceptible TB confers
partial immunity against exogenous re-infection with a different
strain, a population may become more vulnerable to the spread of
MDR-TB when the prevalence of latent TB infection has been
lowered [7]. We hypothesize that improving a population’s TB
prevalence can have dual effects on the probability of an MDR-
TB epidemic. Drug susceptible TB is the substrate from which
MDR TB emerges, but it also may confer partial protection
against exogenous re-infection with MDR-TB. Our findings
suggest that reductions in TB caseloads need to occur rapidly to
eliminate the substrate from which MDR strains emerge before
lack of immunity is sufficiently widespread to ease the spread of
mutant strains. Improving compliance with treatment programs is
one of the chief public health tools to lower the prevalence of drug
susceptible TB. Under certain circumstances, when treatment
compliance is poor, increasing the availability of programs could
actually increase the probability of MDR-TB. This paper identifies
the features of TB control programs that alter the likelihood of
novel MDR-TB strain emergence and the extent of spread of
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 September 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 9 | e12843newly emerged resistant strains. In so doing, the paper highlights
strategies that achieve the goal of controlling drug susceptible TB
while maintaining minimal risk of MDR-TB outbreaks.
Methods
Study design
Some tuberculosis simulation models are constructed specifical-
ly to forecast disease burdens in the future. For forecasting,
validating model output with available empirical observations on
recent disease trends is paramount [8,9,10]. Other simulation
exercises are designed to enhance understanding of the basic
biology of the disease [11]. To understand TB biology, one alters
biological and environmental parameters to see how much these
parameters matter regardless of whether this replicates field data.
This study is of the latter type, designed to understand how MDR-
TB spread reacts to biological and policy parameters along a
continuum that cannot be observed in real world epidemiological
data.
The model begins with a stylized population just launching its
use of antimicrobials and follows their subsequent 500 years of
experience with TB. One could consider the starting conditions to
represent an Alaskan or Native American population in the year
1950 prior to widespread treatment with antimicrobials [12]. The
simulated population will not experience any migration, there is
no age structure, no population growth, no gender, and no co-
infections with conditions that alter susceptibility to TB. Also BCG
is assumed to either not be in use or to have no protective efficacy.
These omitted factors have all had important effects on historical
trends in TB, but because they have little direct effect on the
emergence of resistant TB their inclusion would raise complexity
without helping to address the question of interest. This strategic
decision makes it impossible to seek model validation by
comparing TB trends in the model to historical trends that were
influenced by outside economic factors. Validation depends on
selecting model parameters consistent with the known epidemiol-
ogy of TB transmission and ensuring that the model responds
appropriately to these parameters.
The population is kept constant at 1000 people throughout
time. Each person is modeled individually. Each individual’s TB
status is updated 10 times per year. At each clock interval each
individual obtains random draws from probability distributions
governing contact between susceptible and infectious individuals
and governing the odds that infected individuals will have
progressive disease. All state transitions are calculated one
individual at a time, ten times per year for 500 years. The boxes
in Figure 1 display the various TB states that are tracked for each
individual and the arrows depict the stochastically determined
transition probabilities. At the start of each run of the model it is
assumed that 50% are latently infected with TB and the other
Figure 1. How agents progress in the model. While different in mechanics, the model has states most similar to the Cohen and Murray model.
Healthy agents come into contact with actively infected agents (either drug-susceptible or MDR) and can either be infected and develop latent TB or
remain healthy. Latently infected agents suffer a 10% per year chance of developing active TB for the first 10 years and a 5% per year chance of
developing active TB after 10 years. Actively infected agents with drug-susceptible TB will either receive treatment or die. (Spontaneous cures of TB
are possible but were not included for lack of space). Treated agents receive either DOTS or non-DOTS treatment. DOTS-treated agents recover and
remain non-infective but have a 1% per year relapse rate. Non-DOTS, agents can be fully compliant, and act the same way as DOTS treated agents, or
have user-determined degrees of non-compliance. Non-compliant agents have a probability of developing MDR-TB that reaches a maximum of 1%
when agents take every other dose (50% compliance). DOTS never leads to MDR-TB because by definition every dose is observed and non-
compliance is impossible. Once MDR-TB develops it has user-determined fitness cost which affects the probability of its spread to a susceptible host
and its progression from latent to active.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012843.g001
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high prevalence of latent TB was observed in many real
populations prior to widespread antimicrobial treatment [12,13].
For the first 10 years of latent TB, patients experience a 1%
annual rate of progressing to active TB and 0.5% thereafter [14].
From active TB, agents can die or potentially be detected by a TB
program and then started on treatment. Before receiving
treatment or dying, active TB patients can cause latent infections
in susceptible patients at a rate of 1.3 secondary cases per index
case.
MDR-TB spreads the same way as drug-susceptible TB,
however, MDR-TB can have a fitness cost which reduces both
its infectivity and the probability it will progress out of latency.
Another obstacle is the immunity provided by having drug-
susceptible TB. When the protective effect of drug-susceptible TB
is set at 100%, any contact between an active-MDR case and a
drug-susceptible case never results in MDR infections. In other
sets of runs, the protective effect is set to other values (75% and
50%) so that contact between active-MDR cases and drug-
susceptible cases can result in MDR-infection albeit at a reduced
rate.
All agent-to-agent disease transmission is governed by proba-
bility distributions calibrated to reproduce known TB transmission
rates. Parameters fall into two general categories: biological factors
that are uncontrollable from a policy maker’s view and treatment
factors, amenable to policy. Biological factors include infectivity,
mortality, activation of drug-susceptible TB, and probability of a
new strain of MDR-TB to arise based on non-compliance.
Treatment factors include case detection and compliance. (See
Table 1) Case detection is defined as correct determination that a
diseased individual has active TB. Compliance is defined as the
proportion of prescribed drugs ingested by the patient from 0
percent to 100 percent. The states and pathways listed in Figure 1
are the same states used in prior models of MDR-TB transmission
[15,16,17] The model differs from the Dye model due to the
absence of a separate latent state characterized by rapid
breakdown [18]. The model differs from Cohen/Murray because
only one MDR strain is modeled at a time [17].
The biological effects highlighted by the model are 1)Effects on
the frequency of new MDR-strain emergence due to poor
adherence to drug treatment by TB patients; 2)Effects on the
extent of spread of new strains due to a potential protective benefit
from immunity due to prior latent infection with TB; and 3)Effects
on the extent of spread of new strains attributable to hypothesized
reduction in virulence that mycobacteria sustain in order to
maintain their resistance to antimicrobials, this reduction is known
as a ‘‘fitness cost’’. The importance of these three elements is
discussed below.
The simulation is programmed in NetLogo software [19]. The
full model has been posted in the public domain at mdr.tbtools.
org. Agent based models in NetLogo depict independent
individuals interacting with their neighbors in space and time
following simple rules that the individual agents follow probabi-
listically. The model follows the TB status of every individual over
time from birth to death. New individuals enter and exit the
model, and each generation’s epidemiological environment reflects
the TB prevalence established by the contingent history of prior
generations. This allows the realistic depiction of multi-century
epidemics like TB. The inherent random variation that occurs
across populations and over time makes each run of the model
different. Sensitivity analysis is based on running multiple
iterations with systematically differing parameter settings.
The effect of poor compliance
Directly observed therapy short course (DOTS) is one way to
prevent non-compliance. Ideally, DOTS therapy, being directly
observed, ensures that a patient takes all of their doses, com-
pletely eliminating any non-compliance whatsoever. [20] Non-
compliant agents have a probability of developing MDR-TB
based on the degree of non-compliance. Probability for a new
Table 1. Variables, settings, and sources of parameters in the model.
Treatment Variables Base Case
Range
Tested Source
Probability TB case receives any treatment 50% 25–75%
Probability treated agent receives DOTS 75% 50–100%
The percent of prescribed doses taken by non-compliant agents
receiving non-DOTS treatment
50% 25–75%
Biological Variables
Probability of latent infection in susceptible agent after contact with
active drug-susceptible TB
1.3 secondary cases per primary case of TB
1 Blower & Chou, 2004 [36]
Case Fatality of Untreated Active Drug-susceptible TB 50% per year Murray, Styblo, & Rouillon,
1990 [37]
Probability of progression from latent drug-susceptible TB to active TB 1% per year for first 10 years Styblo, 1991 [14]
0.5% per year after 10 years
MDR-Variables
Relative Fitness
2 75% 50–100%
Immunogenicity multiplier for the probability that a latent drug-
susceptible case can be infected by an MDR case
3
75% 50–100%
1This infectivity is calibrated such that one index case creates on average 1.3 secondary cases in a population of 1000 healthy susceptibles and conforms to Blower
(2004) [36].
2Fitness is a multiplier that determines both the probability of transmission to susceptibles and progression from latent to active in MDR cases.
3DNA fingerprinting of active TB cases shows that it is rare that patients are infected with multiple strains simultaneously [22] making it plausible that latent infection
offers immune protection. Evaluating the potential importance of this phenomenon is one of the key contributions of this model.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012843.t001
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when compliance implies that agents took only half of their
antibiotics. If there is 0% compliance then the bacteria infecting
the agent has no pressure to develop resistance. If there is 100%
compliance then this scenario can be assumed to be exactly like
ideal DOTS.
Cases that are not directly observed may be less compliant, or
they may visit clinicians who use mono-therapy. Either way they
have a higher chance to later develop MDR-TB [21]. DOTS
treated agents have a reduced mortality and have a small
probability of relapse as shown in Table 1.
Protective benefits of drug-susceptible infections with
drug-susceptible TB
It is widely believed that having drug-susceptible infection from
one unique strain of mycobacterium tuberculosis (MTB) grants an
individual full or partial immunity against other different strains of
MTB. Infection with multiple strains is rare [22] although
exogenous re-infection has been documented [23,24,25] Under-
standing the protective benefits of drug-susceptible infection is
important because the prevalence of drug-susceptible MTB is at a
historical low in high-income countries. As the prevalence of drug-
susceptible MTB declines, vulnerability to an imported MDR-
strain may escalate.
Fitness costs
In order for tuberculosis to develop drug resistance in any form,
it must undergo genetic changes [20]. The term. ‘‘fitness cost’’
describes a situation where the genetic changes granting drug
resistance also reduce the ability of MTB to reproduce within its
host population. For example, isoniazid relies on the catalase-
peroxidase activity controlled by the katG gene to transform the
drug from inactive to active form. Typically an isoniazid-resistant
strain will have some gene insertion or deletion that reduces its
katG functionality [17]. Human and animal studies on isoniazid-
resistant strains have demonstrated some, but not all, strains to be
less pathogenic than drug-susceptible (wild-type) tuberculosis
[20,26,27]. Guinea pigs infected with highly resistant strains had
a 100% survival rate, while guinea pigs infected with moderately
resistant strains typically died after 33–43 days [20]. Guinea pigs
infected with drug-susceptible TB typically died after 12–19 days
[20].
Data collation
Table 1 shows the model’s parameters with ranges and sources.
The parameters were applied to the 1000 agents according to the
probability distributions shown in the table. During each run of
the model data were collected on the number of agents in each
category at each time. The outcomes of interest are the percent of
total agent years spent in MDR-categories, the number of runs
where MDR prevalence exceeded 5% (these are counted as having
created an MDR-TB epidemic), and the number of new
developments (index cases) of MDR-TB.
Scenarios and definitions
Nine policy regimes were constructed as three levels of case
detection stratified by three levels of non-compliance to treatment.
Case-detection was set so that 25%, 50% or 75% of all agents with
active tuberculosis received treatment. The proportion of non-
compliant cases was set so that 25%, 50%, or 75% of agents within
a policy scenario were non-compliant to their drug regimen.
Each of the nine policy regimes was run in each of nine different
biological regimes for a total of 81 separate scenarios. The
biological regimes were depicted by three different fitness settings
stratified by three different levels of immunogenic TB infection.
MDR-TB could be 100% as fit, 75% as fit, or 50% as fit as drug-
susceptible strains. Drug-susceptible infection could confer 50%,
75%, or 100% immunity from MDR-TB infection. With 50%
immunity a susceptible individual who contacted an active case of
TB would have half the probability of becoming infected
compared to an individual with no immunity. Nine policy regimes
times nine biological regimes produced 81 permutations of the
model. Each permutation was run 100 times and the results
summarized. The use of 100 iterations enabled the bootstrap
computation of confidence intervals based on the standard
deviation of observations across the iterations of each scenario.
Results
Figures 2 and 3 show some typical graphs of MDR-TB
epidemics that occurred under the various treatment programs
illustrating general trends in MDR-epidemics. These graphs
illustrate a window of vulnerability for MDR-TB where there must
be enough drug-susceptible TB to create MDR-TB index cases,
but not too much drug-susceptible TB to generate host immunity
that inhibits the spread of MDR-TB. With less immunogenic
drug-susceptible TB, higher prevalence is needed to inhibit the
spread of MDR-TB strains after they emerge.
Figure 4 shows in three dimensions, the independent effects of
compliance and case-detection on the probability of an MDR-TB
epidemic. Low case detection rates allow drug-susceptible TB to
flourish. But when TB cases are not detected they are not treated
and MDR-TB cannot emerge unless cases get treated. The model
shows that with low rates of case detection, the resulting high
prevalence of drug-susceptible TB can prevent the rampant
spread of MDR-TB, depending on its immunogenicity. If one
examines the rows of bars in Figure 4 from front row to back row
the slope across the rows becomes steeper in the back row (where
case detection is 75%) compared to the front row where case
detection is 25%. The steepness is an indicator of how important
compliance is in preventing MDR-TB epidemics and our results
show that compliance is more important when case detection
rates are high.
The effects of increasing case-detection are non-linear when
more agents do not comply with therapy. When non-compliance
rates are 50%, intermediate case-detection rates lead to more
emergent strains of MDR-TB than when there is lower or higher
case-detection. This paradox is discussed below.
Figure 5 shows the generalized effects of immunogenicity and
non-compliance on the probability of an MDR outbreak. No
matter how non-compliant the population is, the less immunity
afforded by drug-susceptible TB the higher the probability of an
MDR outbreak. Figure 5 also demonstrates how immunogenicity
parameters moderate the competition between drug-susceptible
and MDR-TB for hosts. The front two rows of Figure 5 show that
when drug-susceptible TB confers 75 to 100% immunity, higher
rates of non-compliance create more cases of drug-susceptible TB
and more individuals immune to MDR-TB, hence lowering the
probability of MDR-TB outbreaks. However, as shown in the back
row of Figure 5, when immunogenicity is 50%, the human ecology
is such that the greater numbers of newly emergent MDR-TB
strains arising, coupled with rising rates of non-compliance are
able to spread throughout the population with greater frequency.
The data supporting Figures 4 and 5 and a summary of all 81
policy and biological regimes is given in tables 2 and 3.
Variation in the outcome of runs tended towards a normal
distribution for each of the tested values. Standard deviations
MDR TB Epidemics
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outcomes from the model. Figures 4 and 5 show the impact of
changing the parameters in the model and provide a sensitivity
analysis of how important both policy and biological parameters
are in supporting or inhibiting the emergence of MDR TB
strains.
Under most treatment policies, lower immunogenicity of drug-
susceptible TB makes MDR-epidemics more probable. However,
the extent to which immunogenicity affected the probability of
MDR-epidemics diminished as MDR-TB became relatively more
fit. Fitness cost appeared to be the greatest obstacle to the spread
of MDR-TB. With MDR-TB set to be 50% as fit as drug-
susceptible TB, MDR-TB could not produce a single epidemic in
the 2700 iterations studied with fitness at this low setting.
Increased MDR-TB fitness almost always led to increased
probability of MDR-TB epidemics. Tables 1 and 2 summarize
the detailed results of 8100 runs (9 policies scenarios69 biological
sets6100 iterations). Additional information is available in
Appendix S1 entitled ‘‘Appendix to Heightened vulnerability to
MDR-TB epidemics after controlling drug-susceptible TB’’.
Discussion
The results of the model stress the need to maintain linkage
between success in TB case detection and success in reducing non-
compliance with TB treatment. As new TB diagnostics are
developed in coming decades, one must consider the implications
of deploying them in areas that cannot maintain high rates of
compliance with treatment. Minimum standards for success in TB
treatment need to accompany phasing in better diagnostics. The
worst scenario in our model in terms of MDR-TB emergence is
high case detection rates combined with high non-compliance
rates as shown in the back row, far right of Figure 4. Although a
heavy focus on compliance without case detection will not stem the
general epidemic of drug susceptible TB, it will keep MDR-TB in
check as shown in the bars along the left edge of Figure 4. The
interesting aspect is that at 25% and 50% rates of non-compliance,
MDR-strains emerge more readily when case detection rates are
intermediate than when they are low or high. This occurs because
intermediate rates of case detection are more likely to open the
window of vulnerability where general TB prevalence is low
Figure 2. Treatment Program with 75% non-compliance and 75% case-detection 100% fitness. These panels are only 2 unique examples
out of 200 runs. In panel A, drug-susceptible is 100% immunogenic, while in panel B it is only 75% immunogenic. Note that with less immunogenic
drug-susceptible TB, MDR-TB takes over more rapidly, and with higher prevalence of drug-susceptible TB present.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012843.g002
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compliant cases circulating in the community poised for breeding
MDR-strains.
An exciting discovery from the model was the presence of
windows of vulnerability for MDR-TB epidemics to emerge.
These windows occur after the prevalence of TB infection and the
immunity it confers has been reduced to less than 30% prevalence
of latent TB leaving most of the population vulnerable. New
emergent strains of MDR-TB could only perpetuate after this
window of vulnerability opened. The window closes when
countries bring their rates of prevalent TB below 5%. At these
low rates of TB prevalence, there are too few cases of active TB for
poor treatment to have a chance to yield MDR-strains. Imported
MDR strains would be a larger threat, but these are not covered in
the model.
MDR-TB epidemics are dependent on the dynamics of
competition between MDR and drug-susceptible TB. (See
figure 5). Both drug-susceptible and MDR-TB compete for a
common resource: susceptible hosts. TB treatment policies in the
model alter how well MDR-TB competes against drug-susceptible
TB. Weak treatment policies that allow non-compliance, select
against drug-susceptible TB and permit resistance to emerge, but
they only give MDR-TB a foothold when most of the population
has not had a prior infection with TB.
Paradoxically, the model shows that a TB program’s success
against drug-susceptible TB makes a population vulnerable to
MDR-TB. A high prevalence of drug-susceptible TB can provide
herd-immunity against MDR-TB, in effect preventing MDR-TB
from progressing out of static low prevalence. The more
immunogenic drug-susceptible TB is, the less the prevalence
needed to achieve herd-immunity. Treatment that reduces the
prevalence of drug-susceptible TB while the population is exposed
to a low prevalence MDR-TB for decades facilitates MDR-TB
epidemics by providing MDR-TB with more susceptible hosts and
the time needed to perpetuate. However, allowing drug-suscepti-
ble TB to remain unchecked is not an acceptable policy strategy.
Speed is the key to a treatment policy that minimizes MDR-TB
development and is effective against drug-susceptible TB. Rapid
Figure 3. Treatment Program with 75% non-compliance and 75% case-detection and MDR with 75% of the fitness of drug
susceptible TB. In panel A, drug-susceptible TB is 100% immunogenic, while in panel B it is only 50% immunogenic. In the A panel, MDR-TB is not fit
enough to cause an epidemic given that drug-susceptible prevalence is high, however with a reduction in immunogenicity, drug-susceptible TB does
not produce herd-immunity. This allows the less fit strain of MDR-TB to cause an epidemic.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012843.g003
MDR TB Epidemics
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 September 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 9 | e12843Figure 4. New MDR strain emergence by rates of non-compliance and case detection. Within each case-detection level, worse non-
compliance always leads to more new MDR strains emerging. This implies that when non compliance is high (i.e. at 75% non-compliance) detecting
more cases leads to more MDR emergence. As noted by arrows, with non-compliance down to 50% or 25% better case detection no longer leads
automatically to more emerging strains of MDR TB. The reason is that there are fewer drug susceptible TB cases for MDR-TB to emerge from when
non-compliance is low and case detection is high.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012843.g004
Figure 5. Probability of MDR-TB outbreaks by non-compliance and the degree of immunogenicity of drug-sensitive TB infection.
Probability of an MDR TB outbreak is highest when patients have highest rates of non-compliance (e.g. 75% non-compliant) and when
immunogenicity of prior infection with TB is low (e.g. 50% of patients are protected from successive infections by prior infections.) The back row of
the graph shows that when with low immunogenicity there is a systematic rise in probability of MDR-TB outbreaks as rates of non-compliance rise. As
shown in the front two rows, this relationship is reversed when immunogenicity is higher. When immunogenicity is high non-compliance serves
primarily to spread the immunizing strain of drug-sensitive TB which lowers the probability of an MDR TB outbreak.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012843.g005
MDR TB Epidemics
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compliance rates. High case-detection rates coupled with high
rates of non- compliance yield high rates of MDR-TB creation as
shown in Figure 4. High compliance rates coupled with low case-
detection are ineffective in controlling drug-susceptible TB. The
key finding regarding policy is to first develop consistent and
rigorous DOTS which must be maintained throughout the course
of improving case detection. Lapsed DOTS while at intermediate
levels of case detection is more permissive of MDR-TB, more so
than at low and high levels of i case detection. With low case
detection the high levels of immunity from latent drug-susceptible
TB hold MDR-TB in check. With high case detection there is less
protection from latent immunity.
In this model as well as other models of MDR-TB, biological
fitness costs can be the greatest natural obstacle to the
development of MDR-TB epidemics. If MDR-TB strains are
substantially unfit then even under less vigilant policy regimes they
cannot spread. In our model, a 25% reduction in fitness (from
100% to 75%) with 50% case-detection and 50% non-compliance
lowers probability of MDR-TB an epidemic from 98% to 3%. It
remains an important goal to quantify the relative fitness of MDR-
TB strains. However, our model highlights that as the quality of
treatment programs improves, the importance of all of the
biological factors of TB diminishes. Good treatment means there
are fewer organisms that can develop resistance and fewer cases of
bad treatment to provide an opportunity for resistance to emerge.
Strengths and limitations
The model is limited in that innate differences in host immunity
(e.g. due to HIV/AIDS) are ignored. Host immunity plays a major
role in the development and spread of tuberculosis as is well
known from the spread of MDR-TB from immunocompetent to
HIV infected patients during an outbreak in New York [28].
Likely, the fitness cost of drug resistance would be moderately
negated, and the immunogenic effect of latent TB would be
lessened in HIV patients. In regards to this, the simulations where
drug susceptible strains are less immunogenic and where MDR
strains are more fit would be informative about how the presence
of prevalent HIV could affect the model. The inclusion of HIV in
subsequent models therefore may reduce the protective effect of
drug susceptible TB on a population level and increase the spread
of less fit strains of MDR-TB. On a population level this reduces
the protective effect of latent drug susceptible TB infection in
regions with highly prevalent HIV infection. HIV co-infection can
be added to later versions of the model, but simplicity was
intentionally stressed in this initial version.
In addition, the model makes no provision for second-line drugs
to treat MDR-TB or for the introduction of new drugs active
against both drug-susceptible and MDR-TB [29,30,31,32]. In
effect the modeled version of MDR-TB is essentially extensively-
drug resistant (XDR) TB (resistant to at least isoniazid, rifampicin
as well as any quinolone and at least one injectable second line
agent). In addition, each new MDR-TB strain has the same
virulence. Whereas in reality, independent cases of MDR-TB
would be likely to have their own unique antibiotic susceptibility as
well as fitness costs [17]. It is reasonable to assume that over time,
independently arising strains that perpetuate would show conver-
gent evolution towards similar compensatory mutations, however
this is likely to be a very slow process.
Another central assumption of the model is that the net death
rate is equivalent to the net birth rate, so population remains
constant. Population density affects the daily contact rate of agents
and therefore the number of secondary cases developed per index
case, and by setting population and therefore population density as
a constant, the model removed a dynamic part of the
epidemiological progression [33,34].
Another important limitation is that there is no migration
because the focus is on the conditions for MDR-strains to emerge
and spread within a single population. Focusing on a population’s
resistance to immigrant strains of MDR-TB would be a
straightforward extension, but much is learned from the current
model by studying the ability of native MDR-strains to arise and
perpetuate. The principal findings regarding how TB treatment
policies affect the probability of new MDR strains arising would
not be changed by the inclusion of population growth and
migration. The prevalence of drug susceptible strains, regardless of
population dynamics, determines the protective benefit from latent
TB. This study concludes that when current knowledge about TB
epidemiology is condensed into a computer model it reveals that
MDR strains are most likely to emerge and spread in populations
that have just begun to enjoy successful control of drug susceptible
TB. The window of vulnerability to the spread of native MDR
strains (and by extension to imported strains) is highest when few
members of the population have ever been infected by TB. This
underscores the current vulnerability of populations in Europe,
Japan, and North America. In the 1990s the re-emergence of TB
in the US was attributed to an abandonment of public health
measures to control TB [35]. Paradoxically it is our current success
in controlling drug-susceptible TB that makes the US population
more vulnerable to both native and introduced outbreaks of
MDR-TB. The most successful approach to reduce this risk would
be to ensure that populations around the world combine high rates
of case finding that is tightly coupled to high compliance with
DOTS.
Supporting Information
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